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Abstract
Recent applications that arise in machine learning have surged significant interest
in solving min-max saddle point games. This problem has been extensively studied
in the convex-concave regime for which a global equilibrium solution can be
computed efficiently. In this paper, we study the problem in the non-convex regime
and show that an ε–first order stationary point of the game can be computed when
one of the player’s objective can be optimized to global optimality efficiently. In
particular, we first consider the case where the objective of one of the players
satisfies the Polyak-Łojasiewicz (PL) condition. For such a game, we show that a
simple multi-step gradient descent-ascent algorithm finds an ε–first order stationary
point of the problem in O˜(ε−2) iterations. Then we show that our framework can
also be applied to the case where the objective of the “max-player" is concave.
In this case, we propose a multi-step gradient descent-ascent algorithm that finds
an ε–first order stationary point of the game in O˜(ε−3.5) iterations, which is the
best known rate in the literature. We applied our algorithm to a fair classification
problem of Fashion-MNIST dataset and observed that the proposed algorithm
results in smoother training and better generalization.
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a wide range of machine learning and robust optimization applications
being formulated as a min-max saddle point game; see [51, 11, 10, 50, 20, 53] and the references
therein. Examples of problems that are formulated under this framework include generative ad-
versarial networks (GANs) [51], reinforcement learning [11], adversarial learning [53], learning
exponential families [10], fair statistical inference [17, 56, 52, 37], generative adversarial imitation
learning [6, 27], distributed non-convex optimization [35] and many others. These applications
require solving an optimization problem of the form
min
θ∈Θ
max
α∈A
f(θ,α). (1)
This optimization problem can be viewed as a zero-sum game between two players. The goal of the
first player is to minimize f(θ,α) by tuning θ, while the other player’s objective is to maximize
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f(θ,α) by tuning α. Gradient-based methods, especially gradient descent-ascent (GDA), are widely
used in practice to solve these problems. GDA alternates between a gradient ascent steps on α and a
gradient descent steps on θ. Despite its popularity, this algorithm fails to converge even for simple
bilinear zero-sum games [41, 39, 14, 2, 32]. This failure was fixed by adding negative momentum or
by using primal-dual methods proposed by [22, 21, 8, 13, 15, 33].
When the objective f is convex in θ and concave in α, the corresponding variational inequality
becomes monotone. This setting has been extensively studied and different algorithms have been
developed for finding a Nash equilibrium [46, 21, 44, 29, 40, 23, 26, 43, 18, 45]. Moreover, [12]
proposed an algorithm for solving a more general setting that covers both monotone and psuedo-
monotone variational problems.
While the convex-concave setting has been extensively studied in the literature, recent machine
learning applications urge the necessity of moving beyond these classical settings. For example, in a
typical GAN problem formulation, two neural networks (generator and discriminator) compete in
a non-convex zero-sum game framework [24]. For general non-convex non-concave games, [28,
Proposition 10] provides an example for which local Nash equilibrium does not exist. Similarly,
one can show that even second-order Nash equilibrium may not exist for non-convex games, see
Section 2 for more details. Therefore, a well-justified objective is to find first order Nash equilibria
of such games [48]; see definitions and discussion in Section 2. The first order Nash equilibrium
can be viewed as a direct extension of the concept of first order stationarity in optimization to the
above min-max game. While ε–first order stationarity in the context of optimization can be found
efficiently in O(ε−2) iterations with gradient descent algorithm [47], the question of whether it is
possible to design a gradient-based algorithm that can find an ε–first order Nash equilibrium for
general non-convex saddle point games remains open.
Several recent results provided a partial answer to the problem of finding first-order stationary points
of a non-convex min-max game. For instance, [51] proposed a stochastic gradient descent algorithm
for the case when f(·, ·) is strongly concave in α and show convergence of the algorithm to an
ε–first-order Nash equilibrium with O˜(ε−2) gradient evaluations. Also, the work [28] analyzes the
gradient descent algorithm with Max-oracle and shows O(−4) gradient evaluations and max-oracle
calls for solving min-max problems where the inner problem can be solved in one iteration using an
existing oracle. More recently, [35, 36] considered the case where f is concave in α. They developed
a descent-ascent algorithm with iteration complexity O˜(ε−4). In this non-convex concave setting,
[50] proposed a stochastic sub-gradient descent method with worst-case complexity O˜(ε−6). Under
the same concavity assumption on f , in this paper, we propose an alternative multi-step framework
that finds an ε–first order Nash equilibrium/stationary with O˜(ε−3.5) gradient evaluations.
In an effort to solve the more general non-convex non-concave setting, [34] developed a framework
that converges to ε-first order stationarity/Nash equilibrium under the assumption that there exists a
solution to the Minty variational inequality at each iteration. Although among the first algorithms
with have theoretical convergence guarantees in the non-convex non-concave setting, the conditions
required are strong and difficult to check. To the best of our knowledge, there is no practical
problem for which the Minty variational inequality condition has been proven. With the motivation of
exploring the non-convex non-concave setting, we propose a simple multi-step gradient descent ascent
algorithm for the case where the objective of one of the players satisfies the Polyak-Łojasiewicz (PL)
condition. We show the worst-case complexity of O˜(ε−2) for our algorithm. This rate is optimal in
terms of dependence on ε up to logarithmic factors as discussed in Section 3. Compared to Minty
variational inequality condition used in [34], the PL condition is very well studied in the literature
and has been theoretically verified for objectives of optimization problems arising in many practical
problems. For example, it has been proven to be true for objectives of over-parameterized deep
networks [16], learning LQR models [19], phase retrieval [54], and many other simple problems
discussed in [30]. In the context of min-max games, it has also been proven useful in generative
adversarial imitation learning with LQR dynamics [6], as discussed in Section 3.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the concepts of First-order Nash
equilibrium (FNE) and ε–FNE. In Section 3, we describe our algorithm designed for min-max games
with the objective of one player satisfying the PL condition. Finally, in Section 4 we describe our
method for solving games in which the function f(θ, α) is concave in α (or convex in θ).
2
2 Two-player Min-Max Games and First-Order Nash Equilibrium
Consider the two-player zero sum min-max game
min
θ∈Θ
max
α∈A
f(θ,α), (2)
where Θ and A are both convex sets, and f(θ,α) is a continuously differentiable function. We say
(θ∗,α∗) ∈ Θ×A is a Nash equilibrium of the game if
f(θ∗,α) ≤ f(θ∗,α∗) ≤ f(θ,α∗) ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀α ∈ A.
In convex-concave games, such a Nash equilibrium always exists [28] and several algorithms were
proposed to find Nash equilibria [23, 26]. However, in the non-convex non-concave regime, comput-
ing these points is in general NP-Hard. In fact, even finding local Nash equilibria is NP-hard in the
general non-convex non-concave regime.In addition, as shown by [28, Proposition 10], local Nash
equilibria for general non-convex non-concave games may not exist. Thus, in this paper we aim for
the less ambitious goal of finding first-order Nash equilibrium which is defined in the sequel.
Definition 2.1 (FNE). A point (θ∗,α∗) ∈ Θ × A is a first order Nash equilibrium (FNE) of the
game (2) if
〈∇θf(θ∗,α∗),θ − θ∗〉 ≥ 0 ∀ θ ∈ Θ and 〈∇αf(θ∗,α∗),α−α∗〉 ≤ 0 ∀ α ∈ A. (3)
Notice that this definition, which is also used in [48, 49], contains the first order necessary optimality
conditions of the objective function of each player [5]. Thus they are necessary conditions for
local Nash equilibrium. Moreover, in the absence of constraints, the above definition simplifies
to ∇θf(θ∗,α∗) = 0 and ∇αf(θ∗,α∗) = 0, which are the well-known unconstrained first-order
optimality conditions. Based on this observation, it is tempting to think that the above first-order
Nash equilibrium condition does not differentiate between the min-max type solutions of (2) and
min-min solutions of the type minθ∈Θ,α∈A f(θ,α). However, the direction of the second inequality
in (3) would be different if we have considered the min-min problem instead of min-max problem.
This different direction makes the problem of finding a FNE non-trivial. The following theorem
guarantees the existence of first-order Nash equilibria under some mild assumptions.
Theorem 2.2 (Restated from Proposition 2 in [48]). Suppose the sets Θ andA are no-empty, compact,
and convex. Moreover, assume that the function f(·, ·) is twice continuously differentiable. Then
there exists a feasible point (θ¯, α¯) that is first-order Nash equilibrium.
The above theorem guarantees existence of FNE points even when (local) Nash equilibria may not
exist. The next natural question is about the computability of such methods. Since in practice we use
iterative methods for computation, we need to define the notion of approximate–FNE.
Definition 2.3 (Approximate FNE). A point (θ∗,α∗) is said to be an ε–first-order Nash equilibrium
(ε–FNE) of the game (2) if
X (θ∗,α∗) ≤ ε and Y(θ∗,α∗) ≤ ε,
where
X (θ∗,α∗) , −min
θ
〈∇θf(θ∗,α∗),θ − θ∗〉 s.t. θ ∈ Θ, ‖θ − θ∗‖ ≤ 1, (4)
and
Y(θ∗,α∗) , max
α
〈∇αf(θ,α),α−α∗〉 s.t. α ∈ A, ‖α−α∗‖ ≤ 1. (5)
In the absence of constraints, ε–FNE in Definition 2.3 reduces to ‖∇θf(θ∗,α∗)‖ ≤
ε and ‖∇αf(θ∗,α∗)‖ ≤ ε.
Remark 2.4. The ε–FNE definition above is based on the first order optimality measure of the
objective of each player. Such first-order optimality measure has been used before in the context of
optimization; see [9]. Such a condition guarantees that each player cannot improve their objective
function using first order information. Similar to the optimization setting, one can define the second-
order Nash equilibrium as a point that each player cannot improve their objective further by using
first and second order information of their objectives. However, the use of second order Nash
equilibria is more subtle in the context of games. The following example shows that such a point may
not exist. Consider the game
min
−1≤θ≤1
max
−2≤α≤2
−θ2 + α2 + 4θα.
Then (0, 0) is the only first-order Nash equilibrium and is not a second-order Nash equilibrium.
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In this paper, our goal is to find an ε–FNE of the game (2) using iterative methods. To proceed, we
make the following standard assumptions about the smoothness of the objective function f .
Assumption 2.5. The function f is continuously differentiable in both θ and α and there exists
constants L11, L22 and L12 such that for every α,α1,α2 ∈ A, and θ,θ1,θ2 ∈ Θ, we have
‖∇θf(θ1,α)−∇θf(θ2,α)‖ ≤ L11‖θ1 − θ2‖, ‖∇αf(θ,α1)−∇αf(θ,α2)‖ ≤ L22‖α1 − α2‖,
‖∇αf(θ1,α)−∇αf(θ2,α)‖ ≤ L12‖θ1 − θ2‖, ‖∇θf(θ,α1)−∇θf(θ,α2)‖ ≤ L12‖α1 − α2‖.
3 Non-Convex PL-Game
In this section, we consider the problem of developing an “efficient" algorithm for finding an ε–FNE
of (2) when the objective of one of the players satistys Polyak-Łojasiewicz (PL) condition. To
proceed, let us first formally define the Polyak-Łojasiewicz (PL) condition.
Definition 3.1 (Polyak-Łojasiewicz Condition). A differentiable function h(x) with the minimum
value h∗ = minx h(x) is said to be µ-Polyak-Łojasiewicz (µ-PL) if
1
2
‖∇h(x)‖2 ≥ µ(h(x)− h∗), ∀x. (6)
The PL-condition has been established and utilized for analyzing many practical modern problems
[30, 19, 16, 54, 6]. Moreover, it is well-known that a function can be non-convex and still satisfy the
PL condition [30]. Based on the definition above, we define a class of min-max PL-games.
Definition 3.2 (PL-Game). We say that the min-max game (2) is a PL-Game if the max player is
unconstrained, i.e., A = Rn, and there exists a constant µ > 0 such that the function hθ(α) ,
−f(θ,α) is µ-PL for any fixed value of θ ∈ Θ.
A simple example of a practical PL-game is detailed next.
Example 3.1 (Generative adversarial imitation learning of linear quadratic regulators). Imitation
learning is a paradigm that aims to learn from an expert’s demonstration of performing a task [6]. It
is known that this learning process can be formulated as a min-max game [27]. In such a game the
minimization is performed over all the policies and the goal is to minimize the discrepancy between the
accumulated reward for expert’s policy and the proposed policy. On the other hand, the maximization
is done over the parameters of the reward function and aims at maximizing this discrepancy over
the parameters of the reward function. This approach is also referred to as generative adversarial
imitation learning (GAIL) [27]. The problem of generative adversarial imitation learning for linear
quadratic regulators [6] refers to solving this problem for the specific case where the underlying
dynamic and the reward function come from a linear quadratic regulator [19]. To be more specific,
this problem can be formulated [6] as minK maxθ∈Θm(K,θ), where K represents the choice of the
policy and θ represents the parameters of the dynamic and the reward functions. Under the discussed
setting, m is strongly concave in θ and PL in K (see [6] for more details). Note that since m is
strongly concave in θ and PL in K, any FNE of the game would also be a Nash equilibrium point.
Also note that the notion of FNE does not depend on the ordering of the min and max. Thus, to be
consistent with our notion of PL-games, we can formulate the problem as
min
θ∈Θ
max
K
−m(K,θ) (7)
Thus, generative adversarial imitation learning of linear quadratic regulators is an example of finding
a FNE for a min-max PL-game.
In what follows, we present a simple iterative method for computing an ε–FNE of PL games.
3.1 Multi-step gradient descent ascent for PL-games
In this section, we propose a multi-step gradient descent ascent algorithm that finds an ε–FNE point
for PL-games. At each iteration, our method runs multiple projected gradient ascent steps to estimate
the solution of the inner maximization problem. This solution is then used to estimate the gradient of
the inner maximization value function, which directly provides a descent direction. In a nutshell, our
proposed algorithm is a gradient descent-like algorithm on the inner maximization value function. To
present the ideas of our multi-step algorithm, let us re-write (2) as
min
θ∈Θ
g(θ), (8)
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where
g(θ) , max
α∈A
f(θ,α). (9)
A famous classical result in optimization is Danskin’s theorem [4] which provides a sufficient
condition under which the gradient of the value function maxα∈A f(θ,α) can be directly evaluated
using the gradient of the objective f(θ,α∗) evaluated at the optimal solution α∗. This result
requires the optimizer α∗ to be unique. Under our PL assumption on f(θ, ·), the inner maximization
problem (9) may have multiple optimal solutions. Hence, Danskin’s theorem does not directly apply.
However, as we will show in Lemma A.5 in the supplementary, under the PL assumption, we still can
show the following result
∇θg(θ) = ∇θf(θ,α∗) with α∗ ∈ arg max
α∈A
f(θ,α),
despite the non-uniqueness of the optimal solution.
Motivated by this result, we propose a Multi-step Gradient Descent Ascent algorithm that solves the
inner maximization problem to “approximate” the gradient of the value function g. This gradient
direction is then used to descent on θ. More specifically, the inner loop (Step 4) in Algorithm 1
solves the maximization problem (9) for a given fixed value θ = θt. The computed solution of
this optimization problem provides an approximation for the gradient of the function g(θ), see
Lemma A.6 in Appendix A. This gradient is then used in Step 7 to descent on θ.
Algorithm 1 Multi-step Gradient Descent Ascent
1: INPUT: K, T , η1 = 1/L22, η2 = 1/L, α0 ∈ A and θ0 ∈ Θ
2: for t = 0, · · · , T − 1 do
3: Set α0(θt) = αt
4: for k = 0, · · · ,K − 1 do
5: Set αk+1(θt) = αk(θt) + η1∇αf(θt,αk(θt))
6: end for
7: Set θt+1 = projΘ
(
θt − η2∇θf(θt,αK(θt))
)
8: end for
9: Return (θt,αK(θt)) for t = 0, · · · , T − 1.
3.2 Convergence analysis of Multi-Step Gradient Descent Ascent Algorithm for PL games
Throughout this section, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3.3. The constraint set Θ is convex and compact. Moreover, there exists a ball with
radius R, denoted by BR, such that Θ ⊆ BR.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.4. Under Assumptions 2.5 and 3.3, for any given scalar ε ∈ (0, 1), if we choose K and
T large enough such that
T ≥ NT (ε) , O(ε−2) and K ≥ NK(ε) , O(log
(
ε−1)
)
,
then there exists an iteration t ∈ {0, · · · , T} such that (θt,αt+1) is an ε–FNE of (2).
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix A.2.
Corollary 3.5. Under Assumption 2.5 and Assumption 3.3, Algorithm 1 finds an ε-FNE of the
game (2) with O(ε−2) gradient evaluations of the objective with respect to θ and O(ε−2 log(ε−1))
gradient evaluations with respect to α. If the two gradient oracles have the same complexity, the
overall complexity of the method would be O(ε−2 log(ε−1)).
Remark 3.6. The iteration complexity order O(ε−2 log(ε−1)) in Theorem 3.4 is tight (up to log-
arithmic factors). This is due to the fact that for general non-convex smooth problems, finding an
ε–stationary solution requires at least Ω(ε−2) gradient evaluations [7, 47]. Clearly, this lower bound
is also valid for finding an ε–FNE of PL-games. This is because we can assume that the function
f(θ,α) does not depend on α (and thus PL in α).
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Remark 3.7. Theorem 3.4 shows that under the PL assumption, the pair (θt,αK(θt)) computed
by Algorithm 1 is an ε–FNE of the game (2). Since αK(θt) is an approximate solution of the inner
maximization problem, we get that θt is concurrently an ε–first order stationary solution of the
optimization problem (8).
Remark 3.8. In [51, Theorem 4.2], a similar result was shown for the case when f(θ,α) is strongly
concave in α. Hence, Theorem 3.4 can be viewed as an extension of [51, Theorem 4.2]. Similar
to [51, Theorem 4.2], one can easily extend the result of Theorem 3.4 to the stochastic setting by
replacing the gradient of f with respect to θ in Step 7 by the stochastic version of the gradient.
In the next section we consider the non-convex concave min-max saddle game. It is well-known
that convexity/concavity does not imply the PL condition and PL condition does not imply convex-
ity/concavity [30]. Therefore, the problems we consider in the next section are neither restriction nor
extension of our results on PL games.
4 Non-Convex Concave Games
In this section, we focus on “non-convex concave" games satisfying the following assumption:
Assumption 4.1. The objective function f(θ,α) is concave in α for any fixed value of θ. Moreover,
the setA is convex and compact, and there exists a ball with radius R that contains the feasible setA.
One major difference of this case with the PL-games is that in this case the function g(θ) =
maxα∈A f(θ,α) might not be differentiable. To see this, consider the example g(α) =
max0≤α≤1(2α− 1)θ which is concave in α. However, the value function g(θ) = |θ| is non-smooth.
Using a small regularization term, we approximate the function g(·) by a differentiable function
gλ(θ) , max
α∈A
fλ(θ,α), (10)
where fλ(θ,α) , f(θ,α) − λ
2
‖α − α¯‖2. Here α¯ ∈ A is some given fixed point and λ > 0 is
a regularization parameter that we will specify later. Since f(θ,α) is concave in α, fλ(θ, ·) is λ-
strongly concave. Thus, the function gλ(·) becomes smooth with Lipschitz gradient; see Lemma B.1
in the supplementary. Using this property, we propose an algorithm that runs at each iteration multiple
steps of Nesterov accelerated projected gradient ascent to estimate the solution of (10). This solution
is then used to estimate the gradient of gλ(θ) which directly provides a descent direction on θ.
Our algorithm computes an ε–FNE point for non-convex concave games with O˜(ε−3.5) gradient
evaluations. Then for sufficiently small regularization coefficient, we show that the computed point is
an ε-FNE.
Notice that since fλ is Lipschitz smooth and based on the compactness assumption, we can define
gθ , maxθ∈Θ ‖∇gλ(θ)‖, gα , maxθ∈Θ ‖∇αfλ(θ,α∗(θ))‖, and gmax = max{gθ, gα, 1},
(11)
where α∗(θ) , arg maxα∈A fλ(θ,α). We are now ready to describe our proposed algorithm.
4.1 Algorithm Description
Our proposed method is outlined in Algorithm 2. This algorithm has two steps: step 2 and step 3. In
step 2,K steps of accelerated gradient ascent method is run over the variable α to find an approximate
maximizer of the problem maxα fλ(θt,α). Then using approximate maximizer αt+1, we update θ
variable using one step of first order methods in step 3.
In step 2, we run K step of accelerated gradient ascent algorithm over the variable α with restart
every N iterations. The details of this subroutine can be found in subsection B.1 of the supplementary
materials. In step 3 of Algorithm 2, we can either use projected gradient descent update rule
θt+1 , projΘ
(
θt − 1
L11 + L212/λ
∇θfλ
(
θt,αt+1
))
,
or Frank-Wolfe update rule described in subsection B.2 in the supplementary material. We show
convergence of the algorithm to ε–FNE in Theorems 4.2.
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Algorithm 2 Multi-Step Frank Wolfe/Projected Gradient Step Framework
Require: Constants L˜ , max{L,L12, gmax}, N , b
√
8L22/λc, K, T , η, λ, θ0 ∈ Θ, α0 ∈ A
1: for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T do
2: Set αt+1 = APGA(αt,θt, η,N,K) by running K steps of Accelerated Projected Gradient
Ascent subroutine (Algorithm 3) with periodic restart at every N iteration.
3: Compute θt+1 using first-order information (Frank-Wolfe or projected gradient descent).
4: end for
Theorem 4.2. Given a scalar ε ∈ (0, 1). Assume that Step 7 in Algorithm 2 sets either runs projected
gradient descent or Frank-Wolfe iteration. Under Assumptions 4.1 and 2.5,
η =
1
L22
, λ , ε
4R
, T ≥ NT (ε) , O(ε−3), and K ≥ NK(ε) , O
(
ε−1/2 log(ε−1)
)
,
then there exists t ∈ {0, . . . , T} such that (θt,αt+1) is an ε–FNE of problem (2).
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix B.4.
Corollary 4.3. Under Assumptions 2.5 and 4.1, Algorithm 2 finds an ε-first-order stationary
solution of the game (2) with O(ε−3) gradient evaluations of the objective with respect θ and
O(ε−0.5 log(ε−1)) gradient evaluations with respect to α. If the two oracles have the same complex-
ity, the overall complexity of the method would be O(ε−3.5 log(ε−1)).
5 Numerical Results
We evaluate the numerical performance of Algorithm 2 in the following two applications:
5.1 Fair Classifier
We conduct two experiment on the Fashion MNIST dataset [55]. This dataset consists of 28× 28
arrays of grayscale pixel images classified into 10 categories of clothing. It includes 60, 000 training
images and 10, 000 testing images.
Experimental Setup: The recent work in [42] observed that training a logisitic regression model
to classify the images of the Fashion MNIST dataset can be biased against certain categories. To
remove this bias, [42] proposed to minimize the maximum loss incurred by the different categories.
We repeat the experiment when using a more complex non-convex Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) model for classification. Similar to [42], we limit our experiment to the three categories
T-shirt/top, Coat, and Shirts, that correspond to the lowest three testing accuracies achieved by the
trained classifier. To minimize the maximum loss over these three categories, we train the classifier to
minimize
min
W
max {L1(W),L2(W),L3(W)}, (12)
where W represents the parameters of the CNN; and L1, L2, and L3 correspond to the loss incurred
by samples in T-shirt/top, Coat, and Shirt categories. Problem (12) can be re-written as
min
W
max
t1,t2,t3
3∑
i=1
tiLi(W) s.t. ti ≥ 0 ∀ i = 1, 2, 3;
3∑
i=1
ti = 1.
Clearly the inner maximization problem is concave; and thus our theory can be applied. To empirically
evaluate the regularization scheme proposed in Section 4, we implement two versions of Algorithm 2.
The first version solves at each iteration the regularized strongly concave sub-problem
max
t1,t2,t3
3∑
i=1
tiLi(W)− λ
2
3∑
i=1
t2i s.t. ti ≥ 0 ∀ i = 1, 2, 3;
3∑
i=1
ti = 1, (13)
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Figure 1: The effect of regularization on the convergence of the training loss, λ = 0.1.
and use the optimum t to perform a gradient descent step on W (notice that fixing the value of W,
the optimum t can be computed using KKT conditions and a simple sorting or bisection procedure).
The second version of Algorithm 2 solves at each iteration the concave inner maximization problem
without the regularization term. Then uses the computed solution to perform a descent step on
W. Notice that in both cases, the optimization with respect to t variable can be done in (almost)
closed-form update. Although regularization is required to have theoretical convergence guarantees,
we compare the two versions of the algorithm on empirical data to determine whether we lose by
adding such regularization. We further compare these two algorithms with normal training that uses
gradient descent to minimize the average loss among the three categories. We run all algorithms
for 5500 epochs and record the test accuracy of the categories. To reduce the effect of random
initialization, we run our methods with 50 different random initializations and record the average
and standard deviation of the test accuracy collected. For fair comparison, the same initialization
is used for all methods in each run. The results are summarized in Tables 1. To test our framework
in stochastic settings, we repeat the experiment running all algorithms for 12, 000 iterations with
Adam and SGD optimizer with a bath size of 600 images (200 from each category). The results of
the second experiment with Adam optimizer are summarized in Table 2. The model architecture and
parameters are detailed in Appendix F. The choice of Adam optimizer is mainly because it is more
robust to the choice of the step-size and thus can be easily tuned. In fact, the use of SGD or Adam
does not change the overall takeaways of the experiments. The results of using SGD optimizer are
relegated to Appendix C.
Results: Tables 1 and 2 show the average and standard deviation of the number of correctly classified
samples. The average and standard deviation are taken over 50 runs. For each run 1000 testing
samples are considered for each category. The results show that when using MinMax and MinMax
with regularization, the accuracies across the different categories are more balanced compared to
normal training. Moreover, the tables show that Algorithm 2 with regularization provides a slightly
better worst-case performance compared to the unregularized approach. Note that the empirical
advantages due to regularization appears more in the stochastic setting. To see this compare the
differences between MinMax and MinMax with Regularization in Tables 1 and 2. Figure 1 depicts a
sample trajectory of deterministic algorithm applied to the regularized and regularized formulations.
This figures shows that regularization provides a smoother and slightly faster convergence compared
to the unregularized approach. In addition, we apply our algorithm to the exact similar logistic
regression setup as in [42]. Results of this experiment can be found in Appendix D.
T-shirt/top Coat Shirt Worst
mean std mean std mean std mean std
Normal 850.72 8.58 843.50 17.24 658.74 17.81 658.74 17.81
MinMax 774.14 10.40 753.88 22.52 766.14 13.59 750.04 18.92
MinMax with Regularization 779.84 10.53 765.56 22.28 762.34 11.91 755.66 15.11
Table 1: The mean and standard deviation of the number of correctly classified samples when gradient
descent is used in training, λ = 0.1.
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T-shirt/top Coat Shirt Worst
mean std mean std mean std mean std
Normal 853.86 10.04 852.22 18.27 683.32 17.96 683.32 17.96
MinMax 753.44 15.12 715.24 32.00 733.42 18.51 711.64 29.02
MinMax with Regularization 764.02 14.12 739.80 27.60 748.84 15.79 734.34 23.54
Table 2: The mean and standard deviation of the number of correctly classified samples when Adam
(mini-batch) is used in training, λ = 0.1.
5.2 Robust Neural Network Training
Experimental Setup: Neural networks have been widely used in various applications, especially in
the field of image recognition. However, these neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks,
such as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [25] and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack [31].
These adversarial attacks show that a small perturbation in the data input can significantly change the
output of a neural network. To train a robust neural network against adversarial attacks, researchers
reformulate the training procedure into a robust min-max optimization formulation [38], such as
min
w
N∑
i=1
max
δi, s.t. |δi|∞≤ε
`(f(xi + δi;w), yi).
Here w is the parameter of the neural network, the pair (xi, yi) denotes the i-th data point, and δi
is the perturbation added to data point i. As discussed in this paper, solving such a non-convex
non-concave min-max optimization problem is computationally challenging. Motivated by the theory
developed in this work, we approximate the above optimization problem with a novel objective
function which is concave in the parameters of the (inner) maximization player. To do so, we first
approximate the inner maximization problem with a finite max problem
min
w
N∑
i=1
max {`(f(xˆi0(w);w), yi), . . . , `(f(xˆi9(w);w), yi)} , (14)
where each xˆij(w) is the result of a targeted attack on sample xi aiming at changing the output of
the network to label j. These perturbed inputs, which are explained in details in Appendix E, are the
function of the weights of the network. Then we replace this finite max inner problem with a concave
problem over a probability simplex. Such a concave inner problem allows us to use the multi-step
gradient descent-ascent method. The structure of the network and the details of the formulation is
detailed in Appendix E.
Results: We compare our results with [38, 57]. Note [57] is the state-of-the-art algorithm and has
won the first place, out of ≈ 2000 submissions, in the NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge.
The accuracy of our formulation against popular attacks, FGSM [25] and PGD [31], are summarized
in Table 3. This table shows that our formulation leads to a comparable results against state-of-the-art
algorithms (while in some cases it also outperform those methods by as much as ≈ 15% accuracy).
Natural FGSM L∞ [25] PGD
40 L∞ [31]
ε = 0.2 ε = 0.3 ε = 0.4 ε = 0.2 ε = 0.3 ε = 0.4
[38] with ε = 0.35 98.58% 96.09% 94.82% 89.84% 94.64% 91.41% 78.67%
[57] with ε = 0.35 97.37% 95.47% 94.86% 79.04% 94.41% 92.69% 85.74%
[57] with ε = 0.40 97.21% 96.19% 96.17% 96.14% 95.01% 94.36% 94.11%
Proposed with ε = 0.40 98.20% 97.04% 96.66% 96.23% 96.00% 95.17% 94.22%
Table 3: Test accuracies under FGSM and PGD attacks. All adversarial images are quantified to 256
levels (0− 255 integer).
Links to code and pre-trained models of above two simulations are available at Appendix G.
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A Proofs for results in Section 3
Before proceeding to the proofs of the main results, we need some intermediate lemmas and prelimi-
nary definitions.
Definition A.1. [1] A function h(x) is said to satisfy the Quadratic Growth (QG) condition with
constant γ > 0 if
h(x)− h∗ ≥ γ
2
dist(x)2, ∀x,
where h∗ is the minimum value of the function, and dist(x) is the distance of the point x to the
optimal solution set.
The following lemma shows that PL implies QG [30].
Lemma A.2 (Corollary of Theorem 2 in [30]). If function f is PL with constant µ, then f satisfies
the quadratic growth condition with constant γ = 4µ.
The next Lemma shows the stability of arg maxα f(θ,α) with respect to θ under PL condition.
Lemma A.3. Assume that {hθ(α) = −f(θ,α) | θ} is a class of µ-PL functions in α. Define
A(θ) = arg maxα f(θ,α) and assume A(θ) is closed. Then for any θ1, θ2 and α1 ∈ A(θ1), there
exists an α2 ∈ A(θ2) such that
‖α1 −α2‖ ≤ L12
2µ
‖θ1 − θ2‖ (15)
Proof. Based on the Lipchitzness of the gradients, we have that ‖∇αf(θ2,α1)‖ ≤ L12‖θ1 − θ2‖.
Then using the PL condition, we know that
g(θ2) + hθ2(α1) ≤
L212
2µ
‖θ1 − θ2‖2. (16)
Now we use the result of Lemma A.2 to show that there exists α2 = arg minα∈A(θ2) ‖α−α1‖2 ∈
A(θ2) such that
2µ‖α1 −α2‖2 ≤ L
2
12
2µ
‖θ1 − θ2‖2 (17)
re-arranging the terms, we get the desired result that
‖α1 −α2‖ ≤ L12
2µ
‖θ1 − θ2‖.
Finally, the following lemma would be useful in the proof of Theorem 3.4.
Lemma A.4 (See Theorem 5 in [30]). Assume h(x) is µ-PL and L-smooth. Then, by applying
gradient descent with step-size 1/L from point x0 for K iterations we get an xK such that
h(x)− h∗ ≤
(
1− µ
L
)K
(h(x0)− h∗), (18)
where h∗ = minx h(x).
We are now ready to prove the results in Section 3.
A.1 Danskin-type Lemma for PL Functions
Lemma A.5. Under Assumption 2.5 and PL-game assumption,
∇θg(θ) = ∇θf(θ,α∗), where α∗ ∈ arg max
α∈A
f(θ,α).
Moreover, g is L-Lipschitz smooth with L = L11 +
L212
2µ
.
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Proof. Let α∗ ∈ arg maxα∈A f(θ,α). By Lemma A.3, for any scalar τ and direction d, there exists
α∗(τ) ∈ arg maxα f(θ + τd,α) such that
‖α∗(τ)−α∗‖ ≤ L12
2µ
τ‖d‖.
To find the directional derivative of g(·), we compute
g(θ + τd)− g(θ) = f(θ + τd,α∗(τ))− f(θ,α∗)
= τ∇θf(θ,α∗)T d+∇αf(θ,α∗)T︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
(α∗(τ)−α∗) +O(τ2),
where the second equality holds by writing the Taylor series expansion of f(·). Thus, by definition of
the directional derivative of g(·), we obtain
g′(θ; d) = lim
τ→0+
g(θ + τd)− g(θ)
τ
= ∇θf(θ,α∗)T d. (19)
Note that this relationship holds for any d. Thus, ∇g(θ) = ∇θf(θ,α∗) for any α∗ ∈
arg maxα∈A f(θ,α) = A(θ). Interestingly, the directional derivative does not depend on the choice
of α∗. This means that∇θf(θ,α1) = ∇θf(θ,α2) for any α1 and α2 in arg maxα∈A f(θ,α).
We finally show that function g is Lipschitz smooth. Let α∗1 ∈ A(θ1) and α∗2 =
arg minα∈A(θ2) ‖α−α∗1‖2 ∈ A(θ2), then
‖∇g(θ1)−∇g(θ2)‖= ‖∇θf(θ1,α∗1)−∇θf(θ2,α∗2)‖
= ‖∇θf(θ1,α∗1)−∇θf(θ2,α∗1) +∇θf(θ2,α∗1)−∇θf(θ2,α∗2)‖
≤ L11‖θ1 − θ2‖+ L12‖α∗1 −α∗2‖
≤
(
L11 +
L212
2µ
)
‖θ1 − θ2‖,
where the last inequality holds by Lemma A.3.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Using Lemma A.5 and Assumption 3.3, we can define
gθ , maxθ∈Θ ‖∇g(θ)‖ and gmax , max{gθ, 1}. (20)
The next result shows that the inner loop in Algorithm 1 computes an approximate gradient of g(·).
In other words,∇θf(θt,αt+1) ≈ ∇g(θt).
Lemma A.6. Define κ = L22µ ≥ 1 and ρ = 1 − 1κ < 1 and assume g(θt) − f(θt,α0(θt)) < ∆,
then for any prescribed ε ∈ (0, 1) if we choose K large enough such that
K ≥ NK(ε) , 1
log 1/ρ
(
4 log(1/ε) + log(215L¯6R¯6∆/L2µ)
)
, (21)
where L¯ = max{L12, L22, L, gmax, 1} and R¯ = max{R, 1}, then the error et ,
∇θf(θt,αK(θt))−∇g(θt) has a norm
‖et‖ ≤ δ , Lε
2
26R(gmax + LR)2
and ‖∇αf(θt,αK(θt))‖ ≤ ε. (22)
Proof. First of all, Lemma A.4 implies that
g(θt)− f(θt,αK(θt)) ≤ ρK∆. (23)
Thus, using the QG result of Lemma A.2, we know that there exists an α∗ ∈ A(θt) such that
‖αK(θt)−α∗‖ ≤ ρK/2
√
∆
2µ
(24)
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Thus,
‖et‖ = ‖∇θf(θt,αK(θt))−∇g(θ)‖ ≤ L12‖αK(θt)−α∗‖
≤ L12ρK/2
√
∆
2µ
≤ Lε
2
26R(gmax + LR)2
, (25)
where the last inequality holds by our choice of K which yields
log (1/ρ)
K ≥ log (1/ε)4 + log (215L¯6R¯6∆/L2µ) = log (215L¯6R¯6∆/L2µε4)
which implies,
ρK ≤ 2L
2ε4µ
212∆R¯2L¯2(2L¯R¯)4
≤ 2L
2ε4µ
212∆R2L¯2(L¯+ L¯R)4
≤ 2L
2ε4µ
212∆R2L¯2(gmax + LR)4
.
Here the second inequality holds since R¯ ≥ 1, and the third inequality holds since gmax ≤ L¯.
To prove the argument of the Lemma, note that
‖∇αf(θt,αK(θt))−∇αf(θt,α∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
‖ ≤ L22‖αK(θt)−α∗‖ ≤ L22ρK/2
√
∆
2µ
≤ ε, (26)
where the last inequality holds by our choice of K which yields
ρK ≤
( ε2µ
L¯2∆
)( ε2L2
215L¯4R¯4
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
≤ ε
2µ
L¯2∆
.
Here the second inequality holds since ε < 1, L¯, R¯ ≥ 1, and L ≤ L¯.
The above lemma implies that Algorithm 1 behaves similar to the simple vanilla gradient descent
method applied to problem (8).
Notice that the assumption g(θt)− f(θt,α0(θt)) ≤ ∆, ∀t could be justified by Lemma A.3. More
specifically, by Lemma A.3,
‖αt+1 −αt‖ ≤ L12
2µ
‖θt+1 − θt‖,
where αt+1 , arg maxα f(θt+1,α) and αt , arg maxα f(θt,α). Hence, the difference between
consecutive optimal solutions computed by the inner loop of the algorithm, are upper bounded by the
difference between corresponding θ’s. Since Θ is a compact set, we can find an upper bound ∆ such
that g(θt)− f(θt, α0(θt)) ≤ ∆, for all t. We are now ready to show Theorem 3.4
Proof. We start by defining
∆g = g(θ0)− g∗,
where g∗ , minθ g(θ) is the optimal value of g. Note that by the compactness assumption of the
set Θ, we have ∆g = g(θ0)− g∗ <∞.
Based on the projection property, we know that〈
θt − 1
L
∇θf(θt,αt+1)− θt+1,θ − θt+1
〉 ≤ 0 ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
Therefore, by setting θ = θt, we get〈∇θf(θt,αt+1),θt+1 − θt〉 ≤ −L‖θt − θt+1‖2,
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which implies〈∇θf(θt,α∗(θt)),θt+1 − θt〉≤ −L‖θt − θt+1‖2 + 〈∇θf(θt,α∗(θt))−∇θf(θt,αt+1),θt+1 − θt〉
= −L‖θt − θt+1‖2 + 〈et, θt − θt+1〉
(27)
where α∗(θt) ∈ arg maxα∈A f(θt,α) and et , ∇θf
(
θt,αt+1
) −∇θf(θt,α∗(θt)). By Taylor
expansion, we have
g(θt+1)≤ g(θt) +
〈∇θf(θt,α∗(θt)),θt+1 − θt〉+ L
2
‖θt+1 − θt‖2
≤ g(θt)− L
2
‖θt+1 − θt‖2 + 〈et,θt − θt+1〉.
(28)
where the last inequality holds by (27). Moreover, by the projection property, we know that〈∇θf(θt,αt+1),θ − θt+1〉 ≥ L〈θt − θt+1,θ − θt+1〉 ∀ θ ∈ Θ,
which implies〈∇θf(θt,αt+1),θ − θt〉≥ 〈∇θf(θt,αt+1),θt+1 − θt〉+ L〈θt − θt+1,θ − θt+1〉
≥ −(gmax + 2LR+ ‖et‖)‖θt+1 − θt‖
≥ −2(gmax + LR)‖θt+1 − θt‖.
(29)
Here the second inequality holds by Cauchy-Schwartz, the definition of et and our assumption that
Θ ⊆ BR. Moreover, the last inequality holds by our choice of K in Lemma A.6 which yields
‖et‖ = ‖∇θf(θt,αK(θt))−∇g(θ)‖ (30)
≤ L12‖αK(θt)−α∗‖
≤ L12ρK/2
√
∆
2µ
≤ 1 (31)
≤ gmax. (32)
Hence,
−Xt ≥ −2(gmax + LR)‖θt+1 − θt‖,
or equivalently
‖θt+1 − θt‖ ≥ Xt
2(gmax + LR)
. (33)
Combined with (28), we get
g(θt+1)− g(θt) ≤ −L
8
X 2t(
gmax + LR
)2 + 2‖et‖R,
where the inequality holds by using Cauchy Schwartz and our assumption that Θ is in a ball of radius
R. Hence,
1
T
∑T−1
t=0 X 2t ≤
8∆g(gmax + LR)
2
LT
+
16δR(gmax + LR)
2
L
≤ ε
2
2
,
where the last inequality holds by using Lemma A.6 and choosing K and T :
T ≥ NT , 32∆g(gmax + LR)
2
Lε2
, K ≥ NK(ε) , 1
log 1/ρ
(
4 log(1/ε) + log(215L¯6R¯6∆/L2µ)
)
.
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Therefore, using Lemma A.6, there exists at least one index t̂ for which
Xt̂ ≤ ε and ‖∇αf(θt̂,αt̂+1)‖ ≤ ε. (34)
This completes the proof of the theorem.
B Algorithmic details and proofs for the results in Section 4
B.1 Accelerated Projected Gradient Ascent Subroutine Used in Algorithm 2
Algorithm 3 APGA: Accelerated Projected Gradient Ascent with Restart
Require: Constants αt, θt, η, K, and N .
1: for k = 0, . . . , bK/Nc do
2: Set γ1 = 1
3: if k = 0 then y1 = αt else y1 = xN
4: for i = 1, 2, . . . , N do
5: Set xi = projA
(
yi + η∇yfλ(θt,yi)
)
6: Set γi+1 =
1 +
√
1 + 4γ2i
2
7: yi+1 = xi +
(γi − 1
γi+1
)
(xi − xi−1)
8: end for
9: end for
10: Return xN
B.2 Frank–Wolfe update rule for Step 3 in Algorithm 2
In Step 3 of Algorithm 2, instead of projected gradient descent discussed in the main body, we can
also run one step of Frank–Wolfe method. More precisely, we can set
θt+1 = θt +
Xt
L˜
ŝt,
where
Xt , −mins 〈∇θfλ(θt,αt+1), s〉
s.t. θt + s ∈ Θ, ‖s‖ ≤ 1,
(35)
and
ŝt , arg mins 〈∇θfλ(θt,αK(θt)), s〉
s.t. θt + s ∈ Θ, ‖s‖ ≤ 1.
(36)
is the first order descent direction. In the unconstrained case, the descent direction is ŝt =
−∇θfλ(θt,αt+1), which becomes the same as the gradient descent step.
B.3 Smoothness of function gλ(·)
Lemma B.1. Under Assumption 2.5 and Assumption 4.1, the function gλ is L-Lipschitz smooth with
L = L11 +
L212
λ
.
Proof. First notice that the differentiability of the function gλ(·) follows directly from Danskin’s
Theorem [4]. It remains to show that gλ is a Lipschitz smooth function. Let
α∗1 , arg max
α∈A
fλ(θ1,α) and α
∗
2 , arg max
α∈A
fλ(θ2,α).
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Then by strong convexity of −fλ(θ, ·), we have
fλ(θ2,α
∗
2) ≤ fλ(θ2,α∗1) + 〈∇αfλ(θ2,α∗1),α∗2 −α∗1〉 −
λ
2
‖α∗2 −α∗1‖2,
and
fλ(θ2,α
∗
1) ≤ fλ(θ2,α∗2) + 〈∇αfλ(θ2,α∗2),α∗1 −α∗2〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0, by optimality of α∗2
−λ
2
‖α∗2 −α∗1‖2.
Adding the two inequalities, we get
〈∇αfλ(θ2,α∗1),α∗2 −α∗1〉 ≥ λ‖α∗2 −α∗1‖2. (37)
Moreover, due to optimality of α∗1, we have
〈∇αfλ(θ1,α∗1),α∗2 −α∗1〉 ≤ 0. (38)
Combining (37) and (38) we obtain
λ‖α∗2 −α∗1‖2 ≤ 〈∇αfλ(θ2,α∗1)−∇αfλ(θ1,α∗1),α∗2 −α∗1〉≤ L12‖θ1 − θ2‖‖α∗2 −α∗1‖, (39)
where the last inequality holds by Cauchy-Schwartz and the Lipschtizness assumption. We finally
show that gλ is Lipschitz smooth.
‖∇gλ(θ1)−∇gλ(θ2)‖= ‖∇θfλ(θ1,α∗1)−∇θfλ(θ2,α∗2)‖
= ‖∇θfλ(θ1,α∗1)−∇θfλ(θ2,α∗1) +∇θfλ(θ2,α∗1)−∇θfλ(θ2,α∗2)‖
≤ L11‖θ1 − θ2‖+ L12‖α∗1 −α∗2‖
≤
(
L11 +
L212
λ
)
‖θ1 − θ2‖,
where the last inequality holds by (39).
Algorithm 2 solves the inner maximization problem using accelerated projected gradient descent
(outlined in Algorithm 3). The next lemma is known for accelerated projected gradient descent when
applied to strongly convex functions.
Lemma B.2. Assume h(x) is λ-strongly convex and L-smooth. Then, applying accelerated projected
gradient descent algorithm [3] with step-size 1/L and restart parameter N ,
√
8L/λ− 1 for K
iterations, we get xK such that
h(xK)− h(x∗) ≤
(
1
2
)K/N
(h(x0)− h(x∗)), (40)
where x∗ , arg minx∈F h(x).
Proof. According to [3, Theorem 4.4], we have
h(xiN )− h(x∗) ≤ 2L
(N + 1)2
‖x(i−1)N − x∗‖2
≤ 4L
λ(N + 1)2
(
h(x(i−1)N )− h(x∗)
)
≤ 1
2
(
h(x(i−1)N )− h(x∗)
)
,
(41)
where the second inequality holds by strong convexity of h and the optimality condition of x∗, and
the last inequality holds by our choice of N . This yields,
h(xK)− h(x∗) ≤ (1
2
)K/N
(
h(x0)− h(x∗)
)
, (42)
which completes our proof.
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B.4 Proof of Theorem 4.2
We first show that the inner loop in Algorithm 2 computes an approximate gradient of gλ(·). In other
words, ∇θfλ(θt,αt+1) ≈ ∇gλ(θt).
Lemma B.3. Define κ =
L22
λ
≥ 1 and assume gλ(θt) − fλ(θt,α0(θt)) < ∆, then for any
prescribed ε ∈ (0, 1) if we choose K large enough such that
K ≥ NK(ε) ,
√
8κ
log 2
(
4 log(1/ε) + log(217L¯6R¯6∆/L2λ)
)
, (43)
where L¯ , max{L12, L22, L, gmax, 1} and R¯ = max{R, 1}, then the error et ,
∇θfλ(θt,αK(θt))−∇gλ(θ) has a norm
‖et‖ ≤ δ , Lε
2
26R(gmax + LR)2
(44)
and
ε
2
≥ Yt,K ,max
s
〈∇αfλ(θt,αK(θt)), s〉
s.t. αK(θt) + s ∈ A, ‖s‖ ≤ 1
. (45)
Proof. Starting from Lemma B.2, we have that
gλ(θt)− fλ(θt,αK(θt)) ≤ 1
2
K√
8κ
∆. (46)
Let α∗(θt) , arg maxα∈A fλ(θt,α). Then by strong convexity of −f(θt, ·), we get
λ
2
‖αK(θt)−α∗(θt)‖2 ≤ gλ(θt)− fλ(θt,αK(θt)) ≤ 1
2
K√
8κ
∆. (47)
Combined with the Lipschitz smoothness property of the objective, we obtain
‖et‖= ‖∇θfλ(θt,αK(θt))−∇gλ(θt)‖
= ‖∇θfλ(θt,αK(θt))−∇θfλ(θt,α∗(θt))‖
≤ L12‖αK(θt)−α∗(θt)‖
≤ L12
2K/2
√
8κ
√
2∆
λ
≤ Lε
2
26R(gmax + LR)2
(48)
where the second inequality uses (47), and the third inequality uses the choice of K in (43) which
yields yields
log
(
2K/
√
8κ
)
≥ log (1/ε)4 + log (217L¯6R¯6∆/L2λ) = log (217L¯6R¯6∆/L2λε4)
which implies,(1
2
)K/2√8κ
≤ Lε
2
√
λ
26
√
2∆R¯L¯(2L¯R¯)2
≤ Lε
2
√
λ
26
√
2∆RL¯(L¯+ L¯R)2
≤ Lε
2
√
λ
26
√
2∆RL¯(gmax + LR)2
.
Here the second inequality holds since R¯ ≥ 1, and the third inequality holds since gmax ≤ L¯. To
prove the second argument of the lemma, we also use the Lipschitz smoothness property of the
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objective to get〈∇αfλ(θt,αK(θt)), s〉= 〈∇αfλ(θt,αK(θt))−∇αfλ(θt,α∗(θt)), s〉+ 〈∇αfλ(θt,α∗(θt)), s〉
≤ ‖∇αfλ(θt,αK(θt))−∇αfλ(θt,α∗(θt))‖‖s‖+
〈∇αfλ(θt,α∗(θt)), s〉
≤ (L22 + λ)‖α∗(θt)−αK(θt))‖‖s‖+
〈∇αfλ(θt,α∗(θt)), s〉.
≤ 2L22‖α∗(θt)−αK(θt))‖‖s‖+
〈∇αfλ(θt,α∗(θt)), s〉,
(49)
where the second inequality holds by our Lipschitzness assumption and the last inequality holds by
our assumption that L22/λ ≥ 1. Moreover,
mins −
〈∇αfλ(θt,α∗(θt)), s〉
s.t. αK(θt) + s ∈ A, ‖s‖ ≤ 1 =
minα −
〈∇αfλ(θt,α∗(θt)),α−αK(θt)〉
s.t. α ∈ A, ‖α−αK(θt)‖ ≤ 1
= −〈∇αfλ(θt,α∗(θt)),α∗(θt)−αK(θt)〉
− maxα
〈∇αfλ(θt,α∗(θt)),α−α∗(θt)〉
s.t. α ∈ A, ‖α−αK(θt)‖ ≤ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
= −〈∇αfλ(θt,α∗(θt)),α∗(θt)−αK(θt)〉
,
(50)
where the last equality holds since α∗(θt) is optimal and ‖α∗(θt)−αK(θt)‖ ≤ 1. Combining (49)
and (50), we get
mins −
〈∇αfλ(θt,αK(θt)), s〉
s.t. αK(θt) + s ∈ A, ‖s‖ ≤ 1 ≥ −
(‖∇αfλ(θt,α∗(θt))‖+ 2L22)‖αK(θt)−α∗‖.
(51)
Hence, using (11), we get
Yt,K ≤
(
2L22 + gmax
)‖αK(θt)−α∗‖
≤ 3L¯
2K/2
√
8κ
√
2∆
λ
≤ ε
2
,
(52)
where the second inequality uses (47), and the last inequality holds by our choice of K in (43) and
since ε ∈ (0, 1).
The above lemma implies that ‖∇θfλ(θt,αK(θt)) − ∇gλ(θt)‖ ≤ δ , Lε
2
64R¯3L¯2
. We now show
that our assumption g(θt)− f(θt,α0(θt)) ≤ ∆ for all t in the above Lemma holds. Let
α∗t+1 , arg max
α∈A
fλ(θt+1,α) and α
∗
t , arg max
α∈A
fλ(θt,α).
Then by strong convexity of −fλ(θ, ·), we have
fλ(θt+1,α
∗
t+1) ≤ fλ(θt+1,α∗t ) + 〈∇αfλ(θt+1,α∗t ),α∗t+1 −α∗t 〉 −
λ
2
‖α∗t+1 −α∗t ‖2,
and
fλ(θt+1,α
∗
t ) ≤ fλ(θt+1,α∗t+1) + 〈∇αfλ(θt+1,α∗t+1),α∗t −α∗t+1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0, by optimality of α∗t+1
−λ
2
‖α∗t+1 −α∗t ‖2.
Adding the two inequalities, we get
〈∇αfλ(θt+1,α∗t ),α∗t+1 −α∗t 〉 ≥ λ‖α∗t+1 −α∗t ‖2. (53)
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Moreover, due to optimality of α∗t , we have
〈∇αfλ(θt,α∗t ),α∗t+1 −α∗t 〉 ≤ 0. (54)
Combining (53) and (54) we obtain
λ‖α∗t+1 −α∗t ‖2 ≤ 〈∇αfλ(θt+1,α∗t )−∇αfλ(θt,α∗t ),α∗t+1 −α∗t 〉≤ L12‖θt − θt+1‖‖α∗t+1 −α∗t ‖, (55)
Thus,
‖αt+1 −αt‖ ≤ L12
λ
‖θt+1 − θt‖.
Hence, the difference between consecutive optimal solutions computed by the inner loop of the
algorithm, are upper bounded by the difference between corresponding θ’s. Since Θ is a compact set,
we can find an upper bound ∆ such that g(θt)− f(θt, α0(θt)) ≤ ∆, for all t.
We are now ready to show the main theorem that implies convergence of our proposed algorithm to an
ε–first-order stationary solution of problem (2). In particular, we show that using∇θfλ(θt,αK(θt))
instead of∇gλ(θt) for a small enough λ in the Frank-Wolfe or projected descent algorithms applied
to gλ, finds an ε–FNE. We are now ready to show Theorem 4.2.
Proof. Frank-Wolfe Steps: We now show the result when Step 7 of Algorithm 2 sets
θt+1 = θt +
Xt
L˜
ŝt.
Using descent lemma on gλ and the definition of L˜ in Algorithm 2, we have
gλ(θt+1) ≤ gλ(θt) +
〈∇gλ(θt),θt+1 − θt〉+ L˜
2
‖θt+1 − θt‖2
= gλ(θt) +
Xt
L˜
〈∇gλ(θt), ŝt〉+ X 2t
2L˜
‖ŝt‖2
≤ gλ(θt) + Xt
L˜
〈∇gλ(θt), ŝt〉+ X 2t
2L˜
= gλ(θt)− Xt
L˜
〈∇θfλ(θt,αK(θt))−∇gλ(θt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
et
, ŝt
〉− X 2t
2L˜
≤ gλ(θt) + Xt
L˜
‖et‖ − X
2
t
2L˜
(56)
where ŝt and Xt are defined in equations (35) and (36) of the manuscript, and the second and last
inequalities use the fact that ‖ŝt‖ ≤ 1.
Summing up these inequalities for all values of t leads to
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
X 2t ≤
2L˜∆
T
+ 4‖et‖gmax ≤ 2L˜∆
T
+
ε2
4
≤ ε
2
2
, (57)
where the first inequality holds since
Xt =
〈∇θfλ(θt,αK(θt))−∇θfλ(θt,α∗(θt))+∇θfλ(θt,α∗(θt)), ŝt〉
≤ gmax + ‖et‖
≤ 2gmax.
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Here the first inequality in (57) holds by (11), Cauchy-Schwartz, and the fact that ‖ŝt‖ ≤ 1. The last
inequality holds by our choice of K in Lemma B.3
K ≥ NK(ε) ,
√
8κ
log 2
(
4 log(1/ε) + log(217L¯6R¯6∆/L2λ)
)
,
which yields ‖et‖ ≤ 1 ≤ gmax and by choosing T such that
T ≥ NT (ε) , 8L˜∆
ε2
.
Therefore, using Lemma B.3, there exists at least one index t̂ for which
Xt̂ ≤ ε and Yt̂,K ≤
ε
2
. (58)
Hence,
Y(θt̂,αK(θt̂)) =
maxs 〈∇αf(θt̂,αK(θt̂)), s〉
s.t. αK(θt̂) + s ∈ A, ‖s‖ ≤ 1
=
maxs 〈∇αfλ(θt̂,αK(θt̂)), s〉+ λ(αK(θt̂)− α¯)T s
s.t. αK(θt̂) + s ∈ A, ‖s‖ ≤ 1
≤ Yt̂,K + λ‖αK(θt̂)− α¯‖
≤ ε
, (59)
where the first inequality uses Cauchy Shwartz and the fact that ‖s‖ ≤ 1, and the last inequality
holds due to (58), the choice of λ in the theorem and our assumption that ‖αK(θt̂)− α¯‖ ≤ 2R.
Projected Gradient Descent:
We start by defining
∆g = gλ(θ0)− g∗,
where g∗λ , minθ gλ(θ) is the optimal value of gλ. Note that by the compactness assumption of the
set Θ, we have ∆g = gλ(θ0)− g∗λ <∞.
We now show the result when Step 7 of Algorithm 2 sets
θt+1 = projΘ
(
θt − 1
L
∇θfλ(θt,αK(t))
)
,
Based on the projection property, we know that〈
θt − 1
L
∇θf(θt,αt+1)− θt+1,θ − θt+1
〉 ≤ 0 ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
Therefore, by setting θ = θt, we get〈∇θf(θt,αt+1),θt+1 − θt〉 ≤ −L‖θt − θt+1‖2,
which implies
〈∇θf(θt,α∗(θt)),θt+1 − θt〉≤ −L‖θt − θt+1‖2 + 〈∇θf(θt,α∗(θt))−∇θf(θt,αt+1),θt+1 − θt〉
= −L‖θt − θt+1‖2 + 〈et, θt − θt+1〉
(60)
where α∗(θt) , arg maxα∈A fλ(θt,α) and et , ∇θf
(
θt,αt+1
)−∇θf(θt,α∗(θt)).
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By Taylor expansion, we have
gλ(θt+1)≤ gλ(θt) +
〈∇θf(θt,α∗(θt)),θt+1 − θt〉+ L
2
‖θt+1 − θt‖2
≤ gλ(θt)− L
2
‖θt+1 − θt‖2 + 〈et,θt − θt+1〉.
(61)
Moreover, by the projection property, we know that〈∇θf(θt,αt+1),θ − θt+1〉 ≥ L〈θt − θt+1,θ − θt+1〉,
which implies〈∇θf(θt,αt+1),θ − θt〉≥ 〈∇θf(θt,αt+1),θt+1 − θt〉+ L〈θt − θt+1,θ − θt+1〉
≥ −(gmax + 2LR+ ‖et‖)‖θt+1 − θt‖
≥ −2(gmax + LR)‖θt+1 − θt‖.
(62)
Here the second inequality holds by Cauchy-Schwartz, the definition of et and our assumption that
Θ ⊆ BR. Moreover, the last inequality holds by our choice of K in Lemma A.6 which yields
‖et‖ = ‖∇θf(θt,αK(θt))−∇g(θ)‖ (63)
≤ L12‖αK(θt)−α∗‖
≤ L12ρK/2
√
∆
2µ
≤ 1 (64)
≤ gmax. (65)
Hence,
−Xt ≥ −2(gmax + LR)‖θt+1 − θt‖,
or equivalently
‖θt+1 − θt‖ ≥ Xt
2(gmax + LR)
. (66)
Combined with (61), we get
gλ(θt+1)− gλ(θt) ≤ −L
8
X 2t(
gmax + LR
)2 + 2‖et‖R,
where the inequality holds by using Cauchy Schwartz and our assumption that Θ is in a ball of radius
R. Hence,
1
T
∑T−1
t=0 X 2t ≤
8∆g(gmax + LR)
2
LT
+
16δR(gmax + LR)
2
L
≤ ε
2
2
,
where the last inequality holds by using Lemma B.3 and choosing K and T :
T ≥ NT (ε) , 32∆g(gmax + LR)
2
Lε2
, and K ≥ NK(ε) ,
√
8κ
log 2
(
4 log(1/ε)+log(217L¯6R¯6∆/L2λ)
)
,
Therefore, using Lemma B.3, there exists at least one index t̂ for which
Xt̂ ≤ ε and Yt̂,K ≤
ε
2
. (67)
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Hence,
Y(θt̂,αK(θt̂)) =
maxs 〈∇αf(θt̂,αK(θt̂)), s〉
s.t. αK(θt̂) + s ∈ A, ‖s‖ ≤ 1
=
maxs 〈∇αfλ(θt̂,αK(θt̂)), s〉+ λ(αK(θt̂)− α¯)T s
s.t. αK(θt̂) + s ∈ A, ‖s‖ ≤ 1
≤ Yt̂,K + λ‖αK(θt̂)− α¯‖
≤ ε
, (68)
where the first inequality uses Cauchy Shwartz and the fact that ‖s‖ ≤ 1, and the last inequality holds
due to (67), the choice of λ in the theorem and our assumption that ‖αK(θt̂)− α¯‖ ≤ 2R.
C Numerical Results on Fashion MNIST with SGD
The results of using SGD optimizer are summarized in Table 4 and Table 5. Note SGD optimizer
requires more tuning and therefore the results when batch-size = 3000 is also included here.
T-shirt/top Coat Shirt Worst
mean std mean std mean std mean std
Normal 850.26 8.59 806.78 18.92 558.72 30.99 558.72 30.99
MinMax 754.68 12.03 699.04 28.76 724.86 18.00 696.60 25.93
MinMax with Regularization 756.16 13.60 701.02 30.07 723.14 18.52 698.16 26.96
Table 4: The mean and standard deviation of the number of correctly classified samples when SGD
(mini-batch) is used in training, λ = 0.05, batch-size = 3000.
T-shirt/top Coat Shirt Worst
mean std mean std mean std mean std
Normal 849.76 8.20 807.60 19.19 563.90 29.64 563.90 29.64
MinMax 755.34 13.72 702.60 26.11 723.70 18.92 700.46 24.02
MinMax with Regularization 754.78 14.92 703.70 24.80 723.44 19.29 701.78 23.13
Table 5: The mean and standard deviation of the number of correctly classified samples when SGD
(mini-batch) is used in training, λ = 0.0005, batch-size = 600.
D Numerical Results on Fashion MNIST with Logistic Rgression Model
Table 6 shows that the proposed formulation gives better accuracies under the worst category (Shirts),
and the accuracies over three categories are more balanced. Note that this model is trained by gradient
descent. The standard derivations not equal to 0 is due to the early termination of the simulation.
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T-shirt/top Pullover Shirt
mean std mean std mean std
[42] 849.00 44.00 876.00 45.00 745.00 60.00
Proposed 778.48 8.78 773.46 8.76 740.60 9.26
Table 6: The mean and standard deviation of the number of correctly classified samples when gradient
descent is used in training, λ = 0.1.
E Numerical Results on Robust Neural Network Training
Neural networks have been widely used in various applications, especially in the field of image
recognition. However, these neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, such as Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [25] and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack [31]. These
adversarial attacks show that a small perturbation in the data input can significantly change the
output of a neural network. To train a robust neural network against adversarial attacks, researchers
reformulate the training procedure into a robust min-max optimization formulation [38], such as
min
w
N∑
i=1
max
δi, s.t. |δi|∞≤ε
`(f(xi + δi;w), yi).
Here w is the parameter of the neural network, the pair (xi, yi) denotes the i-th data point, and δi
is the perturbation added to data point i. As discussed in this paper, solving such a non-convex
non-concave min-max optimization problem is computationally challenging. Motivated by the theory
developed in this work, we approximate the above optimization problem with a novel min-max
objective function which has concave inner optimization problem. To do so, we first approximate the
inner maximization problem with a finite max problem
min
w
N∑
i=1
max {`(f(xˆi0(w);w), yi), . . . , `(f(xˆi9(w);w), yi)} , (69)
where each xˆij(w) is the result of a targeted attack on sample xi aiming at changing the output of
the network to label j. More specifically, xˆij(w) is obtained through the following procedure:
In the one but last layer of the neural network architecture for learning classification on MNIST
we have 10 different neurons, each corresponding with one category of classification. For any
sample (xi, yi) in the dataset and any j = 0, · · · , 9, starting from x0ij = xi, we run gradient ascent to
obtain the following chain of points:
xk+1ij = ProjB(x,ε)
[
xkij + α∇x(Zj(xkij ,w)− Zyi(xkij ,w))
]
, k = 0, · · · ,K − 1,
where Zj is the network logit before softmax corresponding to label j; α > 0 is the step-size;
and ProjB(x,ε)[·] is the projection to the infinity ball with radius ε centered at x. Finally, we set
xˆij(w) = x
K
ij in (69).
Clearly, we can replace the finite max problem (69) with a concave problem over a probability
simplex, i.e.,
min
w
N∑
i=1
max
t∈T
9∑
j=0
tj`
(
f
(
xKij ;w
)
, yi
)
, T = {t ∈ R10 | t ≥ 0, ||t||1 = 1}, (70)
which is non-convex inw, but concave in t. Hence we can apply Algorithm 2 to solve this opimization
problem. We test (70) on MNIST dataset with a Convolutional Neural Network(CNN) with the
architecture detailed in Table 7. The result of our experiment is presented in Table 8.
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Layer Type Shape
Convolution + ReLU 5× 5× 20
Max Pooling 2× 2
Convolution + ReLU 5× 5× 50
Max Pooling 2× 2
Fully Connected + ReLU 800
Fully Connected + ReLU 500
Softmax 10
Table 7: Model Architecture for the MNIST dataset.
Natural FGSM L∞ [25] PGD
40 L∞ [31]
ε = 0.2 ε = 0.3 ε = 0.4 ε = 0.2 ε = 0.3 ε = 0.4
[38] with ε = 0.35 98.58% 96.09% 94.82% 89.84% 94.64% 91.41% 78.67%
[57] with ε = 0.35 97.37% 95.47% 94.86% 79.04% 94.41% 92.69% 85.74%
[57] with ε = 0.40 97.21% 96.19% 96.17% 96.14% 95.01% 94.36% 94.11%
Proposed with ε = 0.40 98.20% 97.04% 96.66% 96.23% 96.00% 95.17% 94.22%
Table 8: Test accuracies under FGSM and PGD attacks. We set K = 10 to train our model, and we
take step-size 0.01 when generating PGD attacks. All adversarial images are quantified to 256 levels
(0− 255 integer).
Remark E.1. We would like to note that there is a mismatch between our theory and this numerical
experiment. In particular, we assume smoothness of the objective function in our theory. However,
in this experiment, the ReLu activation functions and the projection operator make the objective
function non-smooth. We also did not include regularizer (strongly concave term) while solving (70)
as the optimal regularizer was very small (and almost zero).
Remark E.2. The main take away from this experiment is to demonstrate the practicality of the
following idea: when solving general challenging non-convex min-max problems, it might be possible
to approximate it with one-sided non-convex min-max problems where the objective function is
solvable with respect to one of the player’s variable. Such a reformulation leads to computationally
tractable problems and (possibly) no loss in the performance.
F Experimental Setup of Fair Classifier
Layer Type Shape
Convolution + tanh 3× 3× 5
Max Pooling 2× 2
Convolution + tanh 3× 3× 10
Max Pooling 2× 2
Fully Connected + tanh 250
Fully Connected + tanh 100
Softmax 3
Table 9: Model Architecture for the Fashion MNIST dataset. [55]
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Parameter
Learning Rate 0.1 0.05 0.01
Epochs 4000 1000 500
Table 10: Training Parameters for the Fashion MNIST dataset with gradient descent. [55]
Parameter
Learning Rate 10−4 10−5 10−6
Iterations 4000 4000 4000
Batch-size 600
Table 11: Training Parameters for the Fashion MNIST dataset with Adam. [55]
Parameter
Learning Rate 10−3 10−4 10−5
Iterations 8000 8000 8000
Table 12: Training Parameters for the Fashion MNIST dataset with SGD. [55]
G Links
Robust NN Training: https://github.com/optimization-for-data-driven-science/
Robust-NN-Training
Fair Classifier: https://github.com/optimization-for-data-driven-science/
FairFashionMNIST
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